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Transcendence, Morality, and History: 
Emmanuel Levinas and the Discovery 
of Soren Kierkegaard in France 
[I]n France he is all but unknown... [yet] Kierkegaard's ideas are 
fated to play a great role in the spiritual development of mankind. It 
is true that this role is of a special kind. He will hardly be accepted 
among the classics of philosophy . .. but his thought will find a place, 
unseen, in the hearts of men. 
-Lev Shestovl 
When she asked why I had chosen Kierkegaard as an object of study 
and I replied that I did not know, Rachel Bespaloff said: "But don't you 
realize? It is because you are a Jew." 
-Jean Wahl2 
INTRODUCTION 
To judge from his postwar essays on the subject, Emmanuel Levinas re- 
jected the founder of existentialism with no little irritation. Where 
Soren Kierkegaard interpreted Isaac's binding, in Fear and Trembling, 
as a parable about the role of faith in taking the self beyond the merely 
ethical stage, Levinas suggested that it is not Abraham's hand, ready to 
bring the knife to his son's throat, but instead "Abraham's ear for hear- 
ing the voice" that best captures the intent of the biblical story. It 
"brought him back to the ethical order." As Levinas explained it: "That 
[Abraham] obeyed the first voice is astonishing: that he had sufficient 
1. Lev Shestov, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle (Vox clamantis in de- 
serto) (Paris: Vrin, 1936), 35-36. Throughout this article, all translations are my own, un- 
less indicated otherwise. 
2. Jean Wahl, "Discours de cl6ture," in Eliane Amado-Valensi and Jean Halperin, 
eds., La conscience juive. Donnees et debats: Textes des trois premiers Colloques d'in- 
tellectuels juifs de langue francaise organises par la Section francaise du Congres juif 
mondial (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 225. 
YFS 104, Encounters with Levinas, ed. Thomas Trezise, ? 2004 by Yale University. 
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distance with respect to that obedience to hear the second voice-that 
is the essential."3 
The conflict in biblical interpretation mirrors their difference in 
philosophical outlook. Where Kierkegaard recommended, in a famous 
phrase, the "teleological suspension of the ethical," Levinas has be- 
come celebrated for the recovery and reinstatement of morality in phi- 
losophy. Where Kierkegaard narrated the existential drama of the self, 
Levinas dedicated his attention, with equal but apparently opposite fer- 
vency, to the so-called other. "[Hie bequeathed to the history of phi- 
losophy," Levinas complained of the Danish thinker, "an exhibition- 
istic, immodest subjectivity" {PN, 76). Opposing the solitary-and in 
his view, narcissistic and melodramatic-quest of the knight of faith, 
Levinas recommended the calm and healthy solicitude of interpersonal 
morality, "[t]he responsibility that rids the I of its imperialism and ego- 
tism (even the egotism of salvation)" (PN, 73). The pious submission 
to the other: this adventure, for Levinas, is paradoxically the most ad- 
venturous one available to the self. 
Yet when the matter is considered more closely and historically, 
Kierkegaard's philosophical contribution turns out in many respects to 
be a major if unexpected station on the long way to the human other. 
In his portrait of the infinite qualitative difference between God and 
man, Kierkegaard set a crucial precedent for the notion of human "al- 
terity" that Levinas is so renowned for defending. And in severing the 
individual from the all-inclusiveness of the historical process so that 
the self could search for this strangely distant god, Kierkegaard antici- 
pated Levinas's own opposition to a fully historical and world-imma- 
nent picture of human existence. 
For his most passionate contemporary advocates, Levinas's doc- 
trine of "the other" is an utterly novel and wholly convincing approach; 
it finally unseated a long-standing if not permanent Western bias for 
"the same." I doubt that either the historical presumption or the moral 
evaluation is entirely correct. In this essay, I will endeavor to show that 
it is possible to understand Levinas's philosophy as a secularizing im- 
provisation on Kierkegaard's early call for the recovery of the other in 
divine form. But the Kierkegaardian precedent is responsible, I will sug- 
3. These comments are from Emmanuel Levinas, "Existenz und Ethik," Schweizer 
Monatshefte 43 (May 1963): 170-77 and in Jean-Paul Sartre et al., Kierkegaard vivant 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 232-34, 286-88, both rpt., the latter with important changes, 
in Noms propres (see PN, 74, 77). 
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gest, not only for some of the power but also for some of the poverty in 
Levinas's philosophical ethics. 
After a summary reconstruction of the French enthusiasm for 
Kierkegaard's thought, I turn to two neglected episodes in Levinas's en- 
gagement with the interwar fashion. The essential purpose of the study 
is to remember forgotten debates in order to assert their importance as 
evidence regarding Levinas's development generally and the role that 
Kierkegaard and Kierkegaardianism specifically played in it. The the- 
sis throughout is that the Levinasian insistence on "transcendence" 
has a conceptual history. The process through which it came to occupy 
the center of Levinas's thought also, I hope, helps account for some 
persisting mysteries about Levinas's conception of alterity. Just as 
Kierkegaard's picture of the relationship between God and man is sec- 
ularized by Levinas as the very image of intersubjectivity, making it an 
essentially dyadic affair, Kierkegaard's absolute distinction between 
self and history found itself transformed, in Levinas's hands, into just 
as rigid a difference between morality and politics. If these mysteries 
are understood as flaws, then the Kierkegaardian lessons that Levinas 
learned may well turn out to have obstructed as much as they enabled 
his insight. 
THE FRENCH ENTHUSIASM FOR KIERKEGAARD 
Levinas became a philosopher in the midst of Europe's interwar expe- 
rience. Though Kierkegaard's work had percolated throughout the con- 
tinent during the several decades after his death, it is really only thanks 
to the German interwar discovery of his philosophy that he became the 
canonical figure he remains today. It is possible, almost, to say that 
Kierkegaard is a twentieth-century rather than a nineteenth-century 
philosopher. "If we were to write a history of his fame," Hannah Arendt 
observed in 1932, 
only the last fifteen years would concern us, but in those years his fame 
has spread with amazing speed. This fame rests on more than the dis- 
covery and belated appreciation of a great man who was wrongly ne- 
glected in his own time. We are not just making amends for not having 
done him justice earlier. Kierkegaard speaks with a contemporary 
voice; he speaks for an entire generation that is not reading him out of 
historical interest but for intensely personal reasons: mea res agitur.4 
4. Hannah Arendt, "Soren Kierkegaard," Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 January 1932, rpt. 
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This enthusiasm for Kierkegaard's work, in turn, owed its success to 
the prominence of the major Kierkegaardian of post-World War I Eu- 
rope: Karl Barth. The reception of Kierkegaard's thought, which came 
only in a drizzle up to the appropriation in Barth's Epistle to the Ro- 
mans and related writings, is unthinkable without Barth's stormy per- 
sonality and instant fame.5 Then publications by and about the Dane 
poured forth from the German presses in a torrent. Kierkegaard has no 
doubt had no more significant heyday than in the German intellectual 
life of the 1920s. It is less well known, but the French had their own 
Kierkegaard enthusiasm-only, as with their reception of phenome- 
nology, it occurred after a significant delay and with some creative gar- 
bling. But historically speaking, it may have proved more consequen- 
tial as the font from which international "existentialism" eventually 
flowed. What I am arguing in this essay is that, paradoxically enough, 
it also contributed decisively to the more recent interest in philosoph- 
ical ethics. A general overview is therefore in order.6 
The translation of Kierkegaard into French had been spotty and 
often corrupt, especially by comparison to Germany where, by the 
mid- 1920s, readers could benefit from the celebrated edition of Kierke- 
gaard's complete works, translated by Hermann Gottsched and Chris- 
toph Schrempf, that the Jena publisher Eugen Diederichs brought out 
over the decade and a half ending in 1924. By contrast, only in 1932 did 
in Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954, ed. Jerome Kohn, trans. Robert and Rita Kim- 
ber (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1993), 44. 
5. The authoritative study of the Kierkegaard reception before Barth is Habib C. Ma- 
lik, Receiving Soren Kierkegaard: The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, 1997). On Barth's connection, see 
Anders Gemmers and August Messer, Soren Kierkegaard und Karl Barth (Stuttgart: 
Strecker und Schr6der, 1925) and Egon Brinkschmidt, Soren Kierkegaard und Karl Barth 
(Neukirchen: Neukirchener Verlag, 1971). 
6. I have drawn principally on the following accounts: Jean Mesnard, "Kierkegaard 
aux prises avec la conscience francaise," Revue de litterature comparee 9 (1955): 453- 
77; Nelly Viallaneix, "Lectures frangaises," in Niels and Marie Thulstrup, eds., Biblio- 
theca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard (Copen- 
hagen: Reitzel, 1981), and Jean Wahl, "Kierkegaard: Son influence en France," Revue 
danoise (1951): 34-36. See also Francois Bousquet, "Kierkegaard dans la tradition 
theologique francophone," in Niels Jorgen Cappelom and Jon Steward, eds., Kierkegaard 
Revisited (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), and F. J. Belleskov Jansen, "The Study in 
France," in Marie Mikulova Thulstrup, ed., Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15, 
Kierkegaard Research (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1987). See also Jacques Maritain, "Aspects 
contemporains de la pensee religieuse (I)," Fontaine 31 (1943): 18-33, esp. 22-28 on 
Kierkegaard, Barth, and Shestov; in English as "Contemporary Renewals in the Modern 
World," in Maritain et al., Religion and the Modern World (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1941). 
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a complete rendering of any one of Kierkegaard's many books first ap- 
pear in France, The Sickness unto Death under the title Traite du des- 
espoir in a translation by Jean Gateau and Knud Ferlov. A complete edi- 
tion appeared only decades later. There had been, it is true, scattered 
and fragmentary translations-as well as interpretive essays by Victor 
Basch and Henri Delacroix-before World War I.7 Only around 1930, 
however, did anything change-and then, as Nelly Viallaneix observes, 
"everything changed." 
The sociology of knowledge invalidates what Kierkegaard himself 
insinuates. While the reader's experience seems to be personal, a dia- 
logue between himself and the text, it is usually intelligible only as part 
of a trend. "It is from this date forward," Viallaneix remarks of 1930, 
"that Kierkegaard's renown really spread in France-just at the same 
time as France entered a 'crisis' not only economic but social and po- 
litical in form. The anxiety of these annees sombres, nourished by the 
rise of Nazism and the expectation of a new war, made the Kierkegaard- 
ian myth powerful. Translations and interpretations multiplied." The 
kind of context that had made Kierkegaard (like Barth himself) so pop- 
ular a decade earlier in a defeated Germany now came to a France 
wracked by depression and increasing political and social polarization. 
With due allowance for the salient differences between the two mo- 
ments, it is nonetheless true that the political upheaval of these years 
helped foster, for many, the cultural mood so inseparable from the 
Kierkegaardian interest and enthusiasm on the German scene a decade 
earlier.8 
In religious circles, the German enthusiasm had special impact on 
Protestant theology. In this case, the reception of Kierkegaard often 
blended almost indistinguishably with the apotheosis of Barth himself 
in French thought. The key Kierkegaardian texts in Barth's collection 
The Word of God and the Word of Man appeared in French in 1933.9 
The two major journals of French Protestantism-Foi et vie and Le se- 
meur-likewise celebrated and debated Kierkegaard and Barth in the 
early 1930s. Denis de Rougemont, a Swiss writer with close links to 
7. Henri Delacroix, "Soren Kierkegaard," Revue de metaphysique et de morale 8/4 
(1900): 451-84; Victor Basch, "Un individualiste religieux, Soren Kierkegaard," Grande 
revue (1903): 281-320. Levinas knew these publications; see below. 
8. Viallaneix, "Lectures frangaises," 108-9. Similarly, Wahl himself says that "one 
can in fact see that [Kierkegaard's fame] has grown especially since about 1930" (Wahl, 
"Kierkegaard," 34). 
9. Barth, Parole de Dieu, parole humaine, trans. Pierre Maury and Auguste La- 
vanchy (Paris: Editions "Je sers," 1933). 
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French Protestantism (as well as to the nascent College de Sociologie), 
not only published his own studies of Kierkegaard but also founded a 
theological review called Hic et Nunc, explicitly modeled on Kierke- 
gaard's own controversial series of pamphlets, The Moment. 10 
Rougemont's collaborator in this editorial venture, later an impor- 
tant theorist of religion and Islam scholar named Henry Corbin, joined 
the fray, too, learning Danish and translating Barth as well as publish- 
ing a number of articles in Hic et Nunc in preparation for his important 
tract on the subject, which appeared in Recherches philosophiques in 
1934. This article merits special mention in light of the theme of the 
nonhistorical individual. Corbin's article proved among the highest- 
profile introductions to the new German theology of the "wholly 
other" on the French scene. It made the Kierkegaardian case for tran- 
scendence and against history with vigor. "The twofold task of reli- 
gious philosophy which emerged from the Aufklirung," Corbin ex- 
plained, "was the insertion of divine transcendence into the flux of 
history and the reduction of human existence to a generality." But, 
Corbin insisted, "the testimony of dialectical theology tends to show 
definitively how divine transcendence, which is forever outside his- 
tory, i.e. non-historical, can only reveal itself as a concrete relation to 
concrete men." For this reason, instead of allowing itself to be accessed 
through history, the transcendent other is in fact "the foundation of the 
historicity of every concrete individuality."11 A frequent contributor 
to Recherches philosophiques, the famous (if short-lived) journal co- 
founded by his friend Alexandre Koyre, Levinas would, I believe, cer- 
tainly have known of the article. But very little hangs on the connec- 
tion: similar notions about the priority of the wholly other to history 
were soon to be everywhere. 
Indeed, the Kierkegaard enthusiasm did not only penetrate theo- 
logical circles; it also found a deep foothold in the philosophical dis- 
cussions of the time. The Kierkegaardian influence on various German 
philosophers now discussed so intensely in France, leaving aside for a 
moment studies of Kierkegaard himself, could hardly have been more 
10. See, for example, Denis de Rougemont, "Kierkegaard en France," La nouvele re- 
vue franpaise 46/273 (1936): 971-76. On Hic et Nunc, see Bernard Reymond, Theologien 
ou prophete?: Les Francophones et Karl Barth avant 1945 (Lausanne: L'age d'homme, 
1985), chap. 7 and, for the manifesto of the journal, 231-33. 
11. Corbin, "La theologie dialectique et l'histoire," Recherches philosophiques 3 
(1933): 250-84, at 252. On Corbin's later significance, see Steven M. Wasserstrom, Reli- 
gion after Religion: Gershom Scholem, Mircea Eliade, and Henry Corbin at Eranos 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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obvious-beginning with Heidegger himself. (Interestingly, none other 
than Henry Corbin translated the first-and for a long time, only- 
French collection of Heidegger's writings, a defective but important 
rendering.) The cumulative effects were immense. According to Paul 
Ricoeur, the years 1936-1940 were, thanks to the Kierkegaard enthu- 
siasm, those of the starkest intellectual life in the last century-stark- 
est, one might add, until the conversions from existentialism to struc- 
turalism and from structuralism to poststructuralism. Ricoeur goes so 
far as to comment that "Kierkegaard is at the origin of French existen- 
tial phenomenology." Indeed, in a phenomenon that all the early "his- 
tories" of existentialism tacitly recognized, the Kierkegaard enthusi- 
asm may provide one of the best general rubrics for making sense of the 
evolution of French thought as the 1930s waned. As neo-Kantianism 
fell, a kind of "neo-Kierkegaardianism" rushed into the void.12 
Two figures, however, thanks to their book-length studies on the 
subject, were absolutely beyond question the most significant in the 
dissemination and popularization of Kierkegaard in intellectual cir- 
cles. There was first of all the emigre Russian-Jewish thinker Lev 
Shestov (in Paris, "Leon Chestov"), who contributed not just individ- 
ually but through his leadership of a coterie of loyal disciples. And, 
against the background established by all of the more minor figures, 
there towered the philosopher Jean Wahl (also of Jewish origin). His var- 
ious "Kierkegaardian studies"-the phrase he used as the title of his 
1938 collection of writings from the period-were not only most im- 
portant in the Kierkegaard enthusiasm in France generally but, more 
directly for these purposes, they were critical for Levinas's philosophi- 
cal development in particular. 
As it happens, Levinas wrote about Shestov during the 1930s and 
counted Wahl among his closest friends (indeed, he eventually dedi- 
cated Totality and Infinity to Wahl and his wife Marcelle). Conse- 
quently, these two figures need to be given special attention. It was in 
writing about Shestov, as it turns out, that Levinas first had occasion 
to mention his own predecessor Franz Rosenzweig in print-in fact 
12. Martin Heidegger, Qu'est-ce que la metaphysique?: suivi d'extraits sur 1'etre et 
une conference sur Holderlin, trans. Henry Corbin (Paris: Gallimard, 1938); Paul Ricoeur, 
"Philosopher apres Kierkegaard, " Revue de theologie etdephilosophie, 3rd ser., 13 (1963): 
292-316. Mesnard, however, sees Kierkegaard supplanted by Heidegger and Jaspers in 
the "ccnacles" of Parisian existentialism. Mesnard, "Kierkegaard aux prises," 467. Mes- 
nard published his own book on the Dane after the war: Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1948). 
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this comment dwelled on Rosenzweig in more detail than Levinas 
would accord him before (or even in!) Totality and Infinity itself. And 
it was in interacting with Wahl, I will suggest, that Levinas moved from 
the enthusiasm for Kierkegaard to thinking about transcendence in a 
way that steered this enthusiasm in a new direction. The figure whom 
everyone else saw as the distant progenitor of Martin Heidegger, Levi- 
nas wanted to conscript into his battle against this incontestably great 
but (briefly) National Socialist thinker. The Dane would correct the 
German. 
LEVINAS'S INITIAL STATEMENT ON KIERKEGAARD 
Lev Shestov ( 1866-1938, born Lev Isakovich Shvartzsman), once among 
the more prominent Jewish philosophers of the period, had been ex- 
pelled from the new Soviet Union along with many other Russian in- 
tellectuals in 1922.13 After sojourning for some time in Berlin, he set- 
tled definitively in Paris, where he taught at the university before he 
died in the late 1930s. (Paris counted as the most important center of 
the Russian diaspora; Vladimir Nabokov, for example, lived there when 
he wrote his first novel in English, The Real Life of Sebastian Knight.) 
Shestov became immensely fashionable in his old age.14 All of his older 
works were translated; and while he continued to write in Russian, his 
new books typically first came into print in French (and sometimes 
German) editions, published by his friends and admirers, who made up 
a genuine pleiad of followers. Apparently, for example, Georges Bataille 
studied under Shestov; he assisted in the translation of one of his works. 
But the most significant and devoted of Shestov's followers were the 
Russian-born philosopher Rachel Bespaloff and the Romanian-born 
poet Benjamin Fondane (1898-1944, originally Benjamin Wechsler), 
both of whom came to live in Paris at the time; their published work in 
13. It is noteworthy, for example, that an older English-language anthology of Jewish 
thinkers features the work of Shestov along with Rosenzweig and Buber. See Bernard 
Martin, ed., Great Twentieth-Century Jewish Philosophers: Shestov, Rosenzweig, Buber 
(New York: Macmillan, 1969). It is likewise interesting that one of the founders of an- 
other kind of enthusiasm once enthused about Shestov. See Irving Kristol, "All Things 
Are Possible: Selection from a Jewish Existentialist Thinker," Commentary (January 
1952):68-71. 
14. See Benjamin Fondane, Rencontres avec Leon Chestov (Paris: Plasma, 1982) for 
a record of some of his many intellectual contacts. It appears from this book (138) that he 
had personal interactions with Levinas in some capacity. See also Michael Weingrad, 
"New Encounters with Leon Chestov, " Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy (forth- 
coming) for connections to Bataille and to Walter Benjamin. 
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the 1930s featured both extensive appeals to Kierkegaard and elaborate 
homages to their more proximate intellectual master.15 
Still, Shestov's direct influence outstripped that of all of his admir- 
ers. It is thanks to Shestov, for example, that Husserl initially came to 
be known in France, if only in the wildly distorted image available in 
the vituperative polemic Shestov aimed against the master of German 
phenomenology. Though it originally appeared in Russian in 1917, the 
attack only came to the attention of the West in 1926. The somewhat 
vulgar interpretation Shestov offered, to which Levinas's professor Jean 
Hering immediately responded, nonetheless had a certain impact in 
France, no doubt helping to sow Levinas's youthful interest in the sub- 
ject, which climaxed in his dissertation on Husserl's philosophy a few 
years later.16 
But Shestov's interests, especially by the time he settled in Paris, 
were wider. In the many books that appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, 
Shestov not only popularized proto-existentialist Russian writers like 
Chekhov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy, but also looked back to those who 
now appeared, from the perspective of the vanguard, to be the pioneer- 
ing founders of this movement misunderstood in their own times: 
Blaise Pascal, Friedrich Nietzsche, and (of course) Kierkegaard him- 
self.17 
Shestov also argued for a new conception of Judaism that opposed 
15. See esp. Fondane, La conscience malheureuse (Paris: Plasma, 1936), with articles 
on Shestov, Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche; and Rachel Bespaloff, Cheminements 
et carrefours (Paris: Vrin, 1938), with articles on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Fondane 
died in Auschwitz in 1944. Bespaloff earned most fame through her other book De 1'lli- 
ade, pref. Jean Wahl (New York: Brentano's, 1943). In the English edition, On the Iliad, 
trans. Mary McCarthy (New York: Pantheon, 1945), Wahl's foreword is replaced by Her- 
mann Broch's essay "The Style of the Mythical Age: An Introduction." 
16. The feud began with Shestov, "Memento mori: A propos de la theorie de la con- 
naissance d'Edmond Husserl, Revue philosophique de la France et de l'etranger (Janu- 
ary-February 1926): 5 -62, and left a long paper trail, which I omit. The best treatment is 
in Eugene H. Frickey, "The Origins of Phenomenology in France, 1920-1940" (Ph.D. 
diss., Indiana University, 1979), chap. 2; on the merits, see Ramona Fotiade, "Evidence 
et conscience: Lbon Chestov et la critique existentielle de la theorie de l'evidence chez 
Husserl," in Nikita Struve, ed., Leon Chestov: Un philosophe pas comme les autres? 
(Paris: Institut d'etudes slaves, 1996). Levinas's thesis: La theorie de I'intuition dans la 
phenomenologie de Husserl (Paris: Vrin, 1930). 
17. Shestov, La nuit de Gesthemani: Essai sur la philosophie de Pascal, trans. Boris 
de Schloezer (Paris: Grasset, 1923); Les rtvelations de la mort: Dostoievsky-Tolstoy, 
trans. Boris de Schloezer (Paris: Plon, 1923); L'idde du bien chez Tolstoi et Nietzsche: 
Philosophie et predication, trans. T. Beresovski-Chestov and Georges Bataille (Paris: Edi- 
tions du sitcle, 1925); La philosophie de la tragedie: Dostoiewsky et Nietzsche, trans. 
Boris de Schloezer (Paris: J. Schiffrin, 1926). 
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it to, rather than synthesized it with, philosophy. This interpretation 
is epitomized in his Athens and Jerusalem of 1938, the two cities sym- 
bolizing for Shestov the absolute divide between the lies of reason and 
the truths of unreason. Shestov did not hesitate in the least to take up 
the charge of the latter against the dominance of the former. He saw the 
heritage of Greece in European culture as a misleading and tragic ra- 
tionalism that, by refusing to admit the reality of the fundamental hu- 
man experiences of terror, loneliness, uncertainty, and faith, left the 
individual all the more alone when they came.18 It is therefore not sur- 
prising that Shestov could find a source of insight and inspiration in the 
antiphilosophical writings of Kierkegaard in particular. 
Shestov's most important book for these purposes, Kierkegaard et 
la philosophie existentielle (Vox clamantis in deserto), appeared in 
1936, in a translation by Tatiana Rageot and Boris de Schloezer. The 
text, like the rest of Shestov's works of the period, provides a medita- 
tive approach, unclassifiable by the generic standards of today, that 
worked in the grip of passion and, undeterred by academic scruples, 
substituted the declamations of rhetoric for the proofs of reason. It em- 
phasizes two points worth particular mention. 
Most fundamentally, Shestov urged his strict distinction between 
and opposition of Western rationalism and "Eastern" faith. The blan- 
dishments of philosophy could never alter the truth that-as the sub- 
title of the book proposed-man is alone in a desert crying for no one 
to hear. The ultimate questions of existence revealed all philosophy as 
a pack of empty promises; only faith could hope to provide more viable 
answers-and precisely by refusing to comfort and reassure. This dis- 
missal applied quite specifically to the domain of philosophy known as 
ethics: Western morality, especially if rooted in philosophical ratio- 
nalism, the attempt to dictate formalized rules of action, only ob- 
structed existential faith. The mistake of philosophy, Shestov insisted, 
is to lock out, in the service of inhuman abstraction, the absurdity of 
life at it is lived. The theoretical rules of morality could never apply to 
the actual situations of life as they are exigently experienced. "That is 
why," Shestov explained, "Kierkegaard turned, not to reason and 
morality, which demand resignation, but to the absurd and faith, which 
give their sanction to daring. His writings and sermons, raging, fren- 
zied, violent, full of intensity, speak to us of nothing else: ... a mad 
18. Shestov, Athenes et Jerusalem: un essai dephilosophie religieuse, trans. Boris de 
Schloezer (Paris: Flammarion, 1938). 
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flight from the god of the philosophers to the God of Abraham, the God 
of Isaac, the God of Jacob."'9 Accordingly, and as Kierkegaard had so 
brilliantly discovered, the entire program of ethics had to be rejected 
for the sake of a decisive faith in a "teleological suspension of the eth- 
ical." 
Levinas's 1937 review of the book, which appeared soon after its 
publication, is an assessment not only of Shestov but also of the 
Kierkegaard enthusiasm quite generally. Though brief, Levinas's arti- 
cle shows how deeply he rejected many of Shestov's basic premises and 
with them an uncritical fashion. "Kierkegaard's fortunes are by no 
means a fad," Levinas acknowledged near the beginning: 
The moral crisis opened by the Great War has given men the sharp feel- 
ing of the powerlessness of reason and the critical disagreement be- 
tween a rationalistic civilization and the exigencies of the particular 
soul lost in a generalized anonymity. It has put in question, despite the 
remarkable advancement of science and technology, the value, hitherto 
unopposed, of the Greek heritage. On this basis, in different forms, both 
irrationalism and doctrines of violence have been renewed.20 
This passage, which one is entitled to interpret as a global evaluation 
of the relevance and risks of the Kierkegaard enthusiasm as a whole, is 
interesting because it appears to take a dim view of what everyone else 
seemed to find so exciting. Levinas did not hesitate to include Shestov 
in this verdict. 
After summarizing the philosophical harvest of the Kierkegaard en- 
thusiasm-which added up, he said, essentially to the thesis of the in- 
effability of the individual-Levinas wrote: "Whatever response one 
gives to all of these questions, they have to be posed. The internal sig- 
nification of all of the events that constitute my existence has to be re- 
spected, before interpreting them as a function of the universal order 
as constructed by reason." It may not be too much to suggest that, for 
Levinas, while the questions they posed were legitimate, the answers 
given by Kierkegaard and Shestov were mistaken. At least, Levinas ap- 
plied this verdict explicitly to the most important of their conclusions. 
While in the 1930s Levinas might have agreed with these figures that 
19. Shestov, Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle, 383-84; cf. Ronald Grims- 
ley, "Chestov," in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, 276-77. 
20. The review is in (and all quotations are from) Revue des etudes juives 52/1-2 
(July-December 1937): 139-41. 
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faith is the answer, he could not follow them, he continued, in their ex- 
clusive definition of faith as "an enterprise full of risks, a worried faith, 
a religion in which the certainties are always menaced and have to be 
justified again and again, in which, indeed, each instant, pristine and 
pathetic, stands for itself and there are only new beginnings." 
It is true that Levinas shows a complimentary attitude toward 
Shestov in some parts of the review, praising him for the brilliance of 
his style and presentation and recommending the book to those who 
wanted to renew their Judaism "as a religion, if philological research 
on the past of the Jewish people cannot satisfy them and if sterile 
homages before the 'beauty of the Ten Commandments and the ethics 
of the prophets' have left them cold." The dominant sense of the re- 
view, however, is the polite rejection of Shestov and his view-"those 
who know Shestov's works and his battle for Jerusalem against Athens 
will not find it surprising," Levinas noted in passing-that knowledge 
counted only as an "abdication of and annoyance to faith." In the final 
analysis, one can say that Levinas's reaction to the Kierkegaard enthu- 
siasm, at least insofar as he found it represented in Shestov's work, is 
somewhere between discriminating acceptance and outright rejection. 
Insofar as it blended with and added to the irrationalist currents of the 
time, Levinas found it immensely suspect. 
But Levinas sounded another interesting note. Properly interpreted, 
Levinas said, Kierkegaard's thought looked "more subtle" than the en- 
thusiasm that, retrieving it from the past, also distorted it to suit the 
present. One of the ways in which it appeared more complex to dis- 
criminating eyes than in the typical presentation in the course of the 
enthusiasm, Levinas explained, involved Kierkegaard's long love affair 
with that most central rationalist of the Western tradition: Socrates. 
This element of Kierkegaard's career-which began with a dissertation 
on Socratic irony-definitively separated him, Levinas argued, "from 
any vulgar irrationalism." While the Kierkegaard enthusiasm and ex- 
istential philosophy more generally threatened to "break apart the syn- 
thesis of Greece and Judeo-Christianity which the Middle Ages as- 
sumed it had secured," Kierkegaard himself appeared to express a 
different conclusion. For better or worse, "European consciousness 
does not have the strength to forget Socrates." Whatever his reputation, 
Levinas never rejected philosophy. He would attempt to reform it, with 
Kierkegaard's help, turning the suspension of the ethical into the 
ground of ethics. 
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BEYOND FRANZ ROSENZWEIG: 
THE THEME OF TRANSCENDENCE 
Levinas's review of Shestov's Kierkegaardianism is equally impor- 
tant-perhaps more important-for another reason. It is Levinas's only 
published mention of Franz Rosenzweig, not only in the 1930s, but also 
in the two decades that followed. It is therefore important to record and 
to interpret it properly. The review began: 
The thought of Soren Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher who died in 
1855, has experienced for several years now a rare fortune. Jaspers and 
Heidegger in Germany and Jean Wahl and Gabriel Marcel in France- 
these are a few of the names that allow one to measure the extent of an 
influence that also exercised itself, in a very obvious manner, on the 
only modern Jewish philosopher worthy of the name: Franz Rosen- 
zweig. 
In calling Rosenzweig "the only modern Jewish philosopher worthy of 
the name," Levinas tacitly suggested that Shestov does not deserve that 
title. He made this implication explicit later in the review: "M. 
Shestov, a Jewish philosopher, is not a philosopher of Judaism," Levi- 
nas wrote. 
In light of the connection so often stressed in contemporary schol- 
arship between Levinas and his great German-Jewish predecessor, one 
might conclude that the Kierkegaard enthusiasm itself influenced Le- 
vinas only through Rosenzweig's appropriative transformation. In The 
Star of Redemption, his enigmatic masterwork, Rosenzweig praised 
Kierkegaard right at the start for "contest[ing] the Hegelian integration 
of revelation into the whole."21 But in Levinas's lukewarm evaluation 
of the Kierkegaard enthusiasm, particularly the contribution it made 
to the violent irrationalism of the time, Levinas clearly implies that if 
he esteems Rosenzweig, it is either not for his allegiance to Kierke- 
gaardianism or else for his transformation of the Danish philosopher's 
legacy. 
In what sense did Rosenzweig transform Kierkegaard? As the cita- 
tion indicates, Rosenzweig followed Kierkegaard's hostility to "total- 
ity," the Hegelian notion that spirit serves as an all-encompassing fo- 
rum for every aspect of human existence. But the Hegelian totality that 
21. Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William W. Hallo (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1971), 7; cf. Michael D. Oppenheim, "Soren Kierkegaard and 
Franz Rosenzweig: The Movement from Philosophy to Religion" {Ph.D. diss., University 
of California-Santa Barbara, 1976). 
SAMUEL MOYN 35 
Kierkegaard shattered in one form, as Peter Eli Gordon has usefully em- 
phasized, Rosenzweig reintegrated into a new one, speaking repeatedly, 
in his discussions of the Jewish community, of the "new unity" and the 
"new totality."22 For Rosenzweig, as Levinas himself recognized, "the 
subjective protest is impotent" against the "historical necessity" that 
Hegel defended. Accordingly, Rosenzweig "remained Hegelian on one 
point," because he wanted a substitute for the merely subjective out- 
come of "Kierkegaard and the Kierkegaardians and their protest against 
imprisonment in the system or in history."23 Levinas's jaundiced view 
of Kierkegaard, one might therefore conclude, simply followed Rosen- 
zweig's own ultimate rejection of the Danish philosopher. 
It is certainly true that Levinas adopted, out of allegiance to Rosen- 
zweig, the Kierkegaardian opposition to Hegel while straining might- 
ily to avoid the "subjectivist" result-what he derisively called "the 
vanity of a merely personal protest"-to which that opposition origi- 
nally led in Kierkegaard's own works. And yet, one can find serious lim- 
its to the hypothesis of an exact continuation from Rosenzweig to Le- 
vinas. The contemporary penchant is to find the analogies between 
Rosenzweig and Levinas and to leave the matter there. But the more 
one looks, the more plausible other influences-including Kierkegaard- 
ian contributions-become in Levinas's formation. 
There are important considerations on the level of context. As Le- 
vinas himself observed, there were no easy ways to avoid Kierkegaard 
even in the midst of Hegel's Parisian apotheosis in the period after the 
war.24 The brief triumph of Kierkegaardian existentialism in the 1930s, 
a decade too often presented simplistically as the incubator for postwar 
Hegelianism (and communism), left an indelible impression even on 
movements dedicated to breaking with it unceremoniously. "Kierke- 
gaard's philosophy has marked contemporary thought so deeply that 
the reservations and even the rejections it may elicit are yet forms of 
that influence," Levinas remarked in the 1960s. 
[T]he return of Hegelian thought and the fascination it holds are not 
solely attributable to the foundation it provides for the great political 
22. See in general Peter Eli Gordon, Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism 
and German Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, forthcoming for a por- 
trait of Rosenzweig made in Heidegger's holist and communitarian image. 
23. These remarks come from the colloquy that followed Levinas's presentation, 
"'Entre deux mondes' (Biographie spirituelle de Franz Rosenzweig)," in L6vy-Valensi and 
Halperin, eds., La conscience juive, 147. 
24. Michael S. Roth, Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth- 
Century France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). 
36 Yale French Studies 
questions of today.... Neo-Hegelianism derives a kind of nobility from 
its reaction against the exacerbated subjectivism of existence. After one 
hundred years of Kierkegaardian protest, one would like to get beyond 
that pathos ... I have the impression that the seductiveness of the later 
Heidegger for us, and also the attractiveness of neo-Hegelianism and 
Marxism, perhaps even of structuralism, comes-in part of course- 
from a reaction to that completely naked subjectivity that, in its desire 
to avoid losing itself in the universal, rejects all form. [PN, 71, 76] 
The anti-existentialist animus that Levinas interestingly saw as pro- 
viding some of the spiritual motivation for much recent French 
thought, from Marxism to structuralism, never fully exorcised the sub- 
jectivism of Kierkegaard's thought. But then there is good reason to sus- 
pect that Levinas is implicated in the phenomenon he himself identi- 
fied: it is important to look for the ways in which the reservations 
Levinas expressed against (and indeed his eventual rejection of) Kier- 
kegaard's thought were "yet forms of... influence." 
This likelihood raised by the context is born out in an examination 
of the text. The best evidence for Levinas's preference for Kierkegaard 
over Rosenzweig in opposing Hegel is related to the word and concept 
of "transcendence." For better or worse, it is in fact quite difficult to 
find this notion in Rosenzweig's thought, for he explicitly and repeat- 
edly ridiculed it. It is, he argued, "the old [thinking that] addressed the 
problem whether God is transcendent or immanent," whereas the new 
thinking that Rosenzweig advocated simply drops this inquiry.25 By 
the starkest of contrasts, transcendence is a central term and concept 
in Levinas's thought. Just as important, Levinas offered the transcen- 
dent other in opposition to the communitarian picture of intersubjec- 
tivity to be found in Heideggerian theory and fascistic practice; yet it 
is just this alarming ideology of resolute communitarianism that 
Rosenzweig himself insistently advocated in the portrait of the Jewish 
community that concludes his masterpiece.26 
25. Rosenzweig, "Das neue Denken," in Kleinere Schriften (Berlin: Schocken, 1937), 
384. 
26. Gordon argues that Rosenzweig is "alive to the 'we' of community as much as to 
the 'thou' of alterity, " a commitment bringing him into proximity not just to Heidegger 
but also to Carl Schmitt. In The Star of Redemption, Gordon suggests, "Rosenzweig calls 
the founding decision of community 'dreadful' (grauenhaft), since the 'we' must expel 
the 'you' from its bright, melodious circle into the cold dread of the nothing.'.. . This 
notion of the 'We' points to Rosenzweig's profound isagreement with Levinas: For while 
Levinas contested totality on behalf of alterity, Rosenzweig found in Jewish solidarity a 
singular and self-sufficient 'Whole.' Rosenzweig was thus favorable to the very kind of 
holism Levinas rejected on principle" (unpublished manuscript). 
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Because he championed "transcendence"-the alterity of other 
people that resists any reduction to plenitudinous unity-Levinas's al- 
ternative to Hegel apparently took a direction very different from the 
communitarian holism that Rosenzweig himself adopted. Levinas 
hoped for an alternative to lonely subjectivity that did not remain true 
to Hegel even on one point by simply discovering, like Rosenzweig, a 
different kind of whole. If not from Rosenzweig, the point of view of 
transcendence then had to come from somewhere else. 
In his many works, Levinas presented an image of intersubjectivity 
hardly secularized from the theological picture of man humiliated in 
the presence of the divine. If Levinas is still even partially following 
Rosenzweig in these matters (a point of controversy too difficult to en- 
ter into here), he is also, ironically, transforming him in a Kierke- 
gaardian direction and preserving more of Kierkegaard's thought than 
Rosenzweig himself did. In his adoption of the point of view of "tran- 
scendence," Levinas did draw on the Christian Kierkegaard-if only 
through the decisive intermediation of an interwar Jew like himself. 
JEAN WAHL AND THE DISCOVERY OF 
THE THEOLOGICAL OTHER 
Born in 1888, Jean Wahl, a longtime Sorbonne professor, is one of the 
more neglected figures in twentieth-century French intellectual his- 
tory. This omission deserves to be rectified, not least in Levinas stud- 
ies: the acknowledgement of Rosenzweig's influence in Totality and 
Infinity is rarely left unemphasized when a similar homage to Wahl in 
the same book is invariably passed over in silence. 
Wahl and Levinas likely met one another when they each spent the 
winter semester of 1928-29 in Freiburg studying at the feet of their 
phenomenological masters.27 Levinas evoked his friend's personal de- 
meanor and philosophical contribution most memorably at a posthu- 
mous conference in his honor. "That marvelous pointillism of Jean 
Wahl!" Levinas exclaimed. "What a strange effect it produces," he con- 
tinued, likening it to "a child's question coming from the lips of the 
wisest of philosophers." 
27. Wahl's notes on Heidegger's lectures later served as the basis for his authority in 
speaking about Heidegger in France and he cited them throughout his 1930s works. They 
also contributed to his own lecture courses in France on Heidegger, one of which has re- 
cently been published. See Wahl, Introduction a la pensee de Heidegger: Cours donnes 
en Sorbonne de janvier a juin 1946 (Paris: Livre de poche, 1998). 
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In many cases, Jean Wahl may be defined as the child's question within 
the Trojan walls of thought. Or the shaft of light shining through the 
structures of doctrines, striking particular, sometimes unknown points, 
awakening the experience of the other philosopher in the untamed 
state, in which it has retained its freshness prior to becoming hardened 
into a system, before being buried in the depths of an intellectual con- 
struction, before the dulling of its sharp, burning punctuality. 
Wahl's main contribution to French intellectual life, Levinas went on 
to contend, is not so much a finished system as "the rejection of the 
kind of thought that is content with exclusive systems." 
It has been the forerunner of certain daring undertakings (which are not 
all unduly extreme) of current philosophy. It is fair to say that in France 
it has paved the way for a new kind of reader and writer in philosophy, 
and a new sort of book. With it, a blow was struck against the structure 
of the system, philosophy set up in the guise of a logical architecture, 
the philosopher's stronghold or domain: a hereditary domain, to be 
handed down to schools, disciples, epigones-an intellectual feudalism 
amplifying (or as some feel in our time, repressing) the meaningful and 
the reasonable.28 
Wahl's revolt against system (and even meaning) may likewise make it 
difficult to specify his contribution to Levinas's own development; but 
the insight that the attack on the systematic pretensions is something 
Wahl inherited from Kierkegaard's complaints against Hegel may al- 
low some further precision. 
Wahl appears at practically every significant crossroads in the com- 
plicated midcentury transfer of German thought to France-that of the 
Kierkegaard enthusiasm not least. He had begun his philosophical ca- 
reer much earlier than Levinas with a thesis, directed by Henri Bergson 
and dedicated to him, on the subject of time in Descartes's work. He 
claimed to find in all of Descartes's important doctrines, from the treat- 
ment of the cogito to the science of movement, the novel presumption 
that perception took place in the space of an instant. In light of Berg- 
son's new philosophy of time, Wahl seemed to suggest, assumptions 
about the nature of time that must have informed earlier philosophies 
28. Levinas, "Jean Wahl: Sans avoir ni etre," in Levinas et al., Jean Wahl et Gabriel 
Marcel (Paris: Beauchesne, 1976), 17-18,27. The essay is rpt. in Levinas, Horssujet (Saint 
Clement: Fata Morgana, 1987); the English citations here are from Outside the Subject, 
trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 71 and 79. 
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had to be reinterpreted.29 It is perhaps too much of a stretch to claim 
that this contribution on the notion of the "moment" in Descartes pre- 
pared him for his later Kierkegaardian researches. His next book, how- 
ever, certainly did. He published Le malheur de la conscience dans la 
philosophie de Hegel in 1929; it provided a French perspective on the 
Hegelian fugendschriften recently edited and published by Hermann 
Nohl, Johann Hoffmeister, and Georg Lasson that played such a signal 
role in the enthusiasm and reinterpretation of Hegel's philosophy in ex- 
istential form (in tandem with the discovery and publication of Karl 
Marx's own "prescientific" and Hegelian Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts).30 More importantly, Wahl's choice of topic and method 
were themselves indicative of his future trajectory. "Still more than 
with intellectual problems," Wahl argued in his preface, 
Hegel began with moral and religious problems. The examination of his 
youthful fragments undertaken in this book confirms the impression 
one has from reading the Phenomenology; in their light, that text will 
no longer seem like just the introduction to his doctrine but also as a 
culmination: the narration and conclusion of his years of formation and 
voyage through systems. 
In other words, Wahl's choice of theme-the passages on the "unhappy 
consciousness" from the Phenomenology of Spirit, which he separated 
out in order to trace back through Hegel's youth-already, in a sense, 
identified his true interest in Kierkegaard or at least primed him for it. 
"Behind the philosopher," Wahl suggested, "one may discover the the- 
ologian; and behind the rationalist, the romantic."31 
There is no reason, of course, to insist that all of Wahl's interests 
turn out actually to be about Kierkegaard; it is more the case that his 
work, whatever its subject, introduced figures in a heady existential 
brew that makes his ultimate attention to Kierkegaard seem almost 
foreordained. But he also presented Kierkegaard in a version almost in- 
separable not only from Hegel but also from Heidegger and Jaspers, 
29. Wahl, Du r6le de l'idee de linstant dans la philosophie de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 
1920). 
30. Wahl, Le malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1929). 
31. Ibid., v, cf. 8, 194. As Wahl later argued openly, "Kierkegaard's thought is aprotes- 
tation of unhappy consciousness against the very idea of the evolution in which Hegel 
considered that consciousness to have been surpassed" (Etudes kierkegaardiennes [Paris: 
Aubier, 1938] chap. 4, "La lutte contre le hegelianisme," 135). He later came around, writ- 
ing that one "must be wary of attributing too much historical importance to the young 
Hegel" (Petite histoire de l'"existentialisme" [Paris: Club Maintenant, 1947], 23). 
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whom he likewise helped naturalize. As Jean Mesnard protested of 
Wahl's Etudes kierkegaardiennes, "[tlhis book not only devotes a di- 
rect commentary of one hundred octavo pages to the study of Heideg- 
ger and Jaspers, it never stops recalling their presence-indeed, their 
superiority-in the course of all the many notes that ornament the bot- 
toms of the pages."32 The same allegation, if it is one, applies to Wahl's 
other famous work of the period, Vers le concret, which surveyed trends 
in philosophy around the world (including American pragmatism) but 
admitted, as of the third page, that Heidegger had in a sense drawn the 
consequences of all the new discoveries Wahl would detail-so much 
so that a comparison throughout would assist rather than obstruct the 
understanding.33 
But how did he help prepare Levinas's project? Whatever his syn- 
cretism, it is Wahl's naturalization of Kierkegaard's insistence on the 
infinite qualitative difference between God and man, as well as his 
sense of the philosophical relevance of that theme for understanding 
the self, that will now seem like his most important contributions. The 
best example is provided by his article, reprinted in the Etudes kier- 
kegaardiennes, on The Concept of Anxiety. In his summary, Wahl 
stressed how the experience of anxiety, and particularly the individual 
consciousness of sin, both invalidated all philosophies of immanence 
and made God's shattering transcendence an irrefutable fact of life. In 
their most quotidian behavior, people are confusedly searching for the 
other. Kierkegaard's question, as Wahl rightly explained, is therefore 
how to convert the role of this other in the economy of selfhood from 
a source of menace to the grounds of beatitude. The feeling of anxiety 
is "tied to the other that is at first the indeterminate atmosphere in 
which I move," but, if next "interiorized and particularized so that it 
coincides with what is other in myself," could become "the other who 
is highest, to the absolutely other."34 In Wahl's rendition, it is the 
essence of existential therapy, already in Kierkegaard's work, to dis- 
cover and to make a place for the other in the experience of the self. The 
route to solicitude for the other may run through narcissistic self-ab- 
sorption; but the ultimate destination is by no means the self alone. As 
32. Mesnard, "Kierkegaard aux prises avec la tradition frangaise," 467-68. 
33. Wahl, Vers le concret: Etudes dhistoire de la philosophie contemporaine (Paris: 
Vrin, 1932), 3n.l: "We will often refer to Heidegger, who was deeply aware of several of 
the ambitions of contemporary thought." The text (with footnote) had appeared as the 
lead item in the first number of Recherches philosophiques 1 (1931-32): 1-21. 
34. Wahl, Etudes kierkegaardiennes, chap. 7, "Par l'angoisse vers la hauteur," 251. 
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Wahl put it during the war, "The Hegelian dialectic leads us towards a 
vision of the whole," while Kierkegaard's opposite approach results in 
"a sort of nude and blind contact with the Other."35 
If Kierkegaard is a "solipsist" only so far as human others are con- 
cerned, then he would have to be not so much attacked as appropriated 
for simply human relations if a secular philosophy of intersubjectivity 
is the goal. But Wahl not only identified a kind of theological template 
for Levinas's doctrine in Kierkegaard's works; Wahl himself clearly 
meant to translate Kierkegaard to France in a philosophical and not 
simply theological register. Differently put, Wahl's interpretation went 
exactly in the opposite direction from the one that Shestov proposed: 
he hoped to make Kierkegaard a welcome guest at the philosophical 
table that Kierkegaard, on Shestov's reading, had intended to overturn. 
Not surprisingly, as Wahl's book chapters appeared in article form 
throughout the 1930s, Shestov determined that this secular and philo- 
sophical appropriation had to be rejected root and branch. "Something 
needs to be said so that Wahl's 'interpretation' is not unopposed," 
Shestov complained in conversation with Benjamin Fondane.36 When 
Shestov's articles did not interrupt Wahl's appropriation, Fondane, in a 
remarkably malicious review article that also attacked Bespaloff and 
de Rougemont, renewed the ferocious attack. He stormily attacked 
Wahl for the mistake of attempting to sever Kierkegaard's thought from 
theology, as when Wahl saw fit to praise Kierkegaard "even if the reli- 
gious that he describes does not correspond to any reality." Yet Wahl's 
true error, apparently, lay elsewhere. Even more abominably, Wahl had 
reduced Kierkegaard to a theorist-of anxiety, sin, whatever-rather 
than understanding his books as enactments of faith. For Fondane as 
for Shestov, any reading and therefore writing about Kierkegaard re- 
quired living with him through what he suffered and achieved. "I have 
learned that according to Wahl, Kierkegaard did thus and so. But what 
about you? For when I read you, my dear Wahl, I am interested more in 
you than in Kierkegaard himself; I want to know what you think, what 
your torments are, your disquietudes. . . It is strange to say, but if you 
would speak about yourself, I would know better what you think of 
35. Wahl, "Realism, Dialectic, and the Transcendent," Philosophy and Phenomeno- 
logical Research 4/4 (June 1944): 498. 
36. Fondane, Rencontres avec Leon Chestov, 83; cf. 127-28, 140-41, 143. By con- 
trast, thirty years after their publication, Levinas acknowledged Wahl's Etudes in print 
as the product of "the most complete, penetrating, and philosophical of Kierkegaard's 
historians." Levinas, "Existenz und Ethik," 153n. 1. 
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Kierkegaard."37 In this debate among Jews about the meaning of Chris- 
tian knighthood, the professorial Wahl did not oblige his critic. As in- 
dicated by his polite but firm response to this unprovoked attack, Wahl 
wanted to choose the way of rational philosophy rather than irrational 
faith; though he interested himself in Kierkegaard's existential analy- 
sis, he did not follow Kierkegaard in the same fideistic and committed 
sense that Shestov and his followers did.38 
As their careers progressed, both Wahl and Levinas continued to 
show themselves actively interested in the possible detachment of 
transcendence from background theological conceptions. It is histori- 
cally important that Wahl moved furthest in this direction and against 
Levinas's resistance-most clearly when he began, in the mid-1930s, 
to contribute to the vogue of the notion of transcendence by turning 
from historical commentator to independent philosopher. 
THE QUEST FOR A SECULAR PHILOSOPHY OF 
TRANSCENDENCE 
On 4 December 1937, Wahl staged an international event that Levinas 
later recalled as "his famous lecture [sa fameuse communication]."39 
Not surprisingly, this central debate in the French philosophical com- 
munity of the 1930s concerned the secular fate of transcendence. 
Wahl's lecture, entitled "Subjectivity and Transcendence," appeared 
that year in the Bulletin de la Societe franfaise de philosophie along 
with the transcription of a colloquy among Wahl, Gabriel Marcel, and 
Nicholas Berdyaev, as well as written responses from Heidegger, Levi- 
nas, Bespaloff, de Rougemont, Karl Jaspers, Karl L6with, and Raymond 
Aron, among others.40 Levinas later paid homage to the book version 
of this debate-Existence humaine et transcendance, published only 
in 1944 in Switzerland-in his own most famous work, Totality and 
Infinity ("I have drawn much inspiration from the themes evoked in 
37. Fondane, "Heraclite la pauvre; ou, Necessite de Kierkegaard," Cahiers du Sud 
22/177 (November 1935): 762, 765. 
38. Wahl, "Aproposde Kierkegaard," Cahiersdu Sud 22/178 (December 1935): 861- 
62. In a footnote, Wahl noted that he would accept neither the designation of "Kierke- 
gaardian" nor that of "Kierkegaard's disciple." 
39. Levinas et al., Jean Wahl, 28. 
40. See Bulletin de la Societ franfaise de philosophie 37/5 (October-December 
1937): 161-63, 166-211. By total coincidence, Leon Brunschvicg, the chairman of the 
session, announced the sad news that the same Henri Delacroix who had written the first 
analysis of Kierkegaard in France had died the previous day. 
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that study").41 It provides unparalleled insight into the development of 
Levinas's ideas at this moment and in general. 
The central question Wahl raised in his essays was whether 
Kierkegaard's theological conception of transcendence rules out a sec- 
ular conception. He understood why some might doubt it in light of 
Kierkegaard's work. For while Kierkegaard "does not completely deny 
the 'other,' he often (not always) reduces existence to a meditation on 
a single other: God." The question had therefore to be posed. In at- 
tempting to bring the other into the world, Wahl asked, could the exis- 
tentialist follower of Kierkegaard "completely deliver [himself] from 
the theological elements of Kierkegaardian thought?"42 
Not everyone accepted the importance of this question. Denis de 
Rougemont offered this blunt rejection: "But why," he asked, "purify 
philosophy of theology? ... For myself, I cannot conceive of any con- 
crete relation with transcendence that lacked the touch of the divine 
or the sacred." Others showed deeper interest in the problems Wahl had 
posed. Berdyaev, in a move Levinas would also champion, insisted on 
the "very great difference" between the notion of transcendence and 
"the simple proposition that there is a reality beyond, an absolute re- 
ality, God, heaven, what have you. For transcendence is an existential 
experience or occurrence." The thrust of the debate in the 1930s is that, 
if theology is to be made philosophy, then transcendence defined as 
subjective experience will have to be detached from transcendence as 
mythologized in the various dogmatic propositions of the historical 
faiths.43 
What is crucial for the intellectual historian in this debate, I want 
to argue, is the way in which Levinas resisted the penchant to under- 
stand Kierkegaard and Heidegger as continuous and instead cast the 
other's transcendence as portrayed by Kierkegaard as the fundamental 
alternative to Heidegger's immanent philosophy of being-in-the- 
world. Wahl's proposition had been that the contemporary existential- 
41. See Wahl, Existence humaine et transcendance (Neuchatel: Editions de la Ba- 
conniere, 1944); Levinas, TI, 35n.2. Cf. Levinas, "Jean Wahl and Feeling," a review of 
Wahl's 1953 treatise on metaphysics (PN, 110-18). 
42. Bulletin de la Societe franpaise de philosophie, 162. Kierkegaard, according to 
Wahl, left the problem not only whether this conception could admit of a secular trans- 
lation but, even if it could, whether self and other would find themselves alone in their 
dyad to the exclusion of the world. Wahl also introduced a conceptual distinction be- 
tween what he dubbed "transascendence" and "transdescendence" which, as the terms 
imply, have some directionality. 
43. Ibid., 204, 187. 
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ists Heidegger and Jaspers appeared merely to "secularize" [laiciser] 
Kierkegaard's work; in wondering whether one could secularize Kier- 
kegaard's "other," Wahl had missed the fact that for Heidegger the dis- 
covery of the other is not a goal, and transcendence is therefore funda- 
mentally rethought. For Levinas, Wahl's formulation of the problem as 
one of secularizing translation understated the radicalism of Heideg- 
ger's attempt to abolish the problem of transcendence or, more accu- 
rately put, to substitute "ontological difference" for the intersubjective 
other (whether human or divine). 
As background, it is crucial to know how Heidegger had dealt with 
the subject. In his important essay "On the Essence of the Ground," 
Heidegger had explicitly defined transcendence initially as self-tran- 
scendence, the refusal of the self to be like a static thing and as always 
in movement; and then, and more fundamentally, as transcendence 
from existents to existence.44 These arguments marginalized not just 
the traditional religious definition of God's transcendence of the world, 
so important to Kierkegaard, but also anypossible secular theory of the 
transcendence of one existent over another. 
Levinas followed Berdyaev's appeal to the existential fact that some 
kinds of this interpersonal transcendence are rooted in experience, 
while the theologies of different religious sects are extrapolated from 
those more universal intimations. For Levinas, "the problems to which 
theology furnishes the solutions are entirely independent of it; they 
come into view by virtue of the simple fact that men exist." In other 
words, existential problems appeared to be those that both underwrote 
all sects and were therefore, in a sense, the subject they all presupposed 
and were really about before they diverged into controversy.45 
More crucially, Levinas argued that the concept of transcendence is 
one that Heidegger had intended not to secularize but instead to over- 
come. For Levinas, "the form that existential philosophy takes in Hei- 
degger's thought distances itself as far as possible from theology." He 
explained his definition of secularization: "Whatever the role of theol- 
ogy in Heidegger's intellectual formation, everyone should grant that, 
for him, to secularize a notion cannot simply mean camouflaging its 
religious dimension. Secularization must involve an operation which 
ends by truly surpassing the theological point of view." The point at 
44. Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes, " Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phinome- 
nologische Forschung 8 (1929): 1-138, rpt. in Wegmarken (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 
1967). 
45. Bulletin de la Societ, 194. 
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which Heidegger made this attempt, Levinas said, counted as "the 
touchiest [le plus nevralgique] of his philosophy."46 
As Levinas argued, the discourse of the encountered other, whether 
in religious and theological or secular or existential form, is ontic. It 
concerned the "transcendence" between two beings. But the entire 
point, as well as the "great interest," of Heidegger's work, Levinas said, 
"consists in showing that at the base of man's ontic adventure there is 
something more than a relation of one 'existent' with another: there is 
the comprehension of being more fundamentally." And "human exis- 
tence . . . only interests Heidegger because it allows a penetration to 
ontology." For Heidegger, human existence, and therefore the forum of 
religious or interpersonal transcendence, is (supposedly) not of inde- 
pendent interest.47 At this point Levinas could draw his most impor- 
tant conclusion. For Heidegger, transcendence "does not mean ... the 
relation [passage] of one 'existent' to another, but that of the existent 
towards being." Accordingly, "Heidegger breaks with theology exactly 
insofar as he makes the distinction between the ontic and the ontolog- 
ical (and he makes it with a radicalism without precedent in the his- 
tory of philosophy)."48 
While Levinas did not criticize Heidegger in so many words, there 
is more in the comments than simple clarification. There is a funda- 
mental alternative presented in the way Levinas structured the prob- 
46. Ibid. (emphasis added). In his letter, L6with understood Heidegger's relation to 
theology to be even more paradoxical: "Jaspers's philosophy is, at bottom, ersatz religion, 
in spite of the fact that Jaspers is essentially an antitheological partisan of the Enlight- 
enment. In contrast, Heidegger's philosophy is anti-Christian, in spite of the fact that- 
or even because-he has remained essentially a theologian.... In Heidegger, one still 
senses an immediately religious motivation at work-only it is perverted" (Ibid., 204). 
Lowith had contributed to the French Kierkegaard enthusiasm with his article, 
"L'achevement de la philosophie classique par Hegel et sa dissolution chez Marx et 
Kierkegaard," Recherches philosophiques 4 (1934-35), later incorporated into his fa- 
mous history of nineteenth-century thought, From Hegel to Nietzsche. 
47. Bulletin de la Societe, 194-95. Heidegger's intervention in the debate is not sur- 
prising in this light. Long before the Letter on Humanism, he wrote simply to say that, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom, he did not practice Existenzphilosophie and, in a 
prefiguration of his postwar Letter, to insist that "the question with which I am con- 
cerned is not that of man's existence; it is the question of being as a whole and by itself." 
As for the existentialism beginning to rule Paris, Heidegger said, it seemed exposed to 
the "twin danger that it will collapse into theology or else dissolve into abstraction." 
Wahl replied somewhat unconvincingly that, all the same, by Heidegger's own lights, ex- 
istential philosophy provided the only means of approach to the problem of being. It 
seemed strange, to Wahl, for Heidegger now to disown what he had himself helped in- 
vent. Ibid., 193. 
48. Ibid., 195. 
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lem. A choice has to be made. It determines what philosophical mean- 
ing, if any, "transcendence" will have. Either one remains at the level 
of the existent or one descends, with Heidegger, to the plane of being. 
Either the level of existents, and transcendence between and among 
them, or the plane of their being, and transcendence toward it. In effect, 
Levinas suggested that even the secular theory of interpersonal tran- 
scendence that Wahl wanted to develop presupposed the Kierkegaard- 
ian experience of the other's transcendence that, far from secularizing, 
Heidegger analytically marginalized. 
Levinas did not join Wahl's quest for a secularized conception of 
transcendence as emphatically in the interwar debate as he would later; 
indeed, Levinas's 1937 comments suggest that a full commitment to 
secular philosophy might require the radical redefinition of transcen- 
dence that Heidegger offered. But a focus on this difference in the 1930s 
would occlude the deeper premise that Wahl and Levinas shared. It con- 
sisted in a preference for Kierkegaard's interpersonal definition of tran- 
scendence against the ontological definition that Heidegger pioneered. 
When Levinas later tried to make his own philosophy of intersubjec- 
tive transcendence purely secular, he would do so, it bears noting, in 
spite of the implication of his own argument from the 1930s that an in- 
tersubjective definition of transcendence remained crypto-theological 
rather than secular, ultimately dependent on the relation between God 
and man that it tried to cast in purely human terms. Secularization 
must involve an operation that ends by truly surpassing the theologi- 
cal point of view. 
KIERKEGAARD ALIVE 
I have thus suggested that the philosophy of the other which is now so 
commonplace, in manifold forms, is historically speaking a kind of 
"ethical theology" (on the model of Carl Schmitt's political theology). 
Already in the interwar period, I have tried to show, Levinas came to 
defend a Kierkegaardian theology of self and other as an alternative to 
Heideggerian ontology (not its precursor). This essay must leave aside 
the interesting finale of Levinas's Kierkegaard journey except to note 
that he came to believe he had found a way to preserve the Kierkegaard- 
ian solicitude for the other without the theological foundation he had 
earlier supposed it might require.49 Ironically, Levinas's mature de- 
49. Samuel Moyn, Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Theology and 
Humanity, 1928-1961 (forthcoming). 
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fense of a purely human and secular ethics in Totality and Infinity 
brought him back to his own demand against Shestov for a rationalist 
Kierkegaard as well as to Wahl's project of finding a secular one. 
Not that anyone paid attention to Levinas at the time. "In a sense," 
Georges Bataille perceptively noted, "Emmanuel Levinas has situated 
himself outside of 'French existentialism,' if that expression refers to 
a unified group epitomized by Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Merleau- 
Ponty. "50 Levinas attempted a neo-Kierkegaardianism different enough 
from the reigning, Sartrean version of the fashion to be ignored for 
decades. In fact, the triumph of existentialism went so far that Levinas 
felt free to assimilate the Kierkegaard on whom he had drawn to the 
Heidegger and Sartre whom he philosophically rejected. When Jean 
Wahl-initially interned at Drancy51 in 1941 and then, after a fortu- 
nate release, a professor at the New School and Mount Holyoke during 
the war-staged another colloquium in 1946 that, like the one the 
decade before, gathered many of the leaders of the Parisian philosoph- 
ical field together for a contentious attempt to clarify together the spirit 
of the age, Levinas made evident his distance from the new movement, 
to the point of obscuring his recourse to one existentialist to respond 
to another. 
In his interventions, Levinas reduced the Kierkegaard enthusiasm 
as it had occurred in Germany and France to Heidegger's thought, as if 
there were no point to discussing Kierkegaard and the controversy were 
really about Heidegger himself. It was as though, far from paving the 
way for Heidegger, as other interpreters argued, Kierkegaard had been 
revived only because he had approached, without reaching, the inde- 
pendent content of Heidegger's own analyses. 
It is possible that behind each phrase of Heidegger there is some 
Kierkegaardian thought-certainly, Kierkegaard was well known in 
Germany and even in France, as Henri Delacroix and Victor Basch 
had written on him at the beginning of this century-but it is thanks to 
Heidegger that this train of thought has sounded a philosophical note. 
I mean that, prior to Heidegger, Kierkegaard was confined to the 
provinces of essay, psychology, aesthetics, or theology, and that after 
Heidegger, he came into the purview of philosophy. 
50. Georges Bataille, "De l'existentialisme au primat de 1'economie," Critique 3/21 
(February 1948): 126. 
51. See eanWahl, "Poemes (Drancy 1941)," Fontaine32(1944): 135-50, rpt. inWahl, 
Poemes (Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1945). 
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In a sense, if Kierkegaard counted as important philosophically, it is 
only because Heidegger did first.52 
And yet, Levinas's (questionable) historiographical assimilation of 
Kierkegaard to Heidegger in the postwar era may have led him to for- 
get the interwar history of his own philosophical recourse to the Dane's 
search for the divine other in overcoming the German's all-too-human 
communitarianism. This recourse left clear legacies not just in his vo- 
cabulary-whenever he spoke of the "transcendence" of the "other"- 
but in his concepts, too. I have suggested how this occurred historically. 
And in Levinas's philosophical masterpiece, Totality and Infinity, the 
essence of Kierkegaard's defense of the individual against history and 
his depiction of the self's relation to a higher other remain strong-in- 
deed, central-elements. 
The rejection of history is prominent in the book among his open- 
ing moves. The viewpoint of morality, Levinas explained, is opposed to 
the Hegelian vision of politics, which necessarily involves the slaugh- 
ter-bench. The irreducibility of the individual that Levinas calls, in To- 
tality and Infinity, "separation," shows the limits of the Hegelian phi- 
losophy of history, which denies the significance of separation in order 
to integrate each individual into a larger story than himself. The con- 
sciousness of separation is different from-indeed, the disconfirma- 
tion of-the historical point of view. The self, thanks to separation, 
must always understand itself as in medias res and therefore unsub- 
latable, even projectively, into some larger epic. The point of view of 
the last man, therefore, betrays the very history whose final meaning 
the Hegelian claims to deduce. The individual refuses to be reduced to 
"a pure loss figuring in an alien accounting system" of the recollective 
owl's sweeping comprehension of the whole. Instead, "[t]he real must 
not only be determined in its historical objectivity, but also from inte- 
rior intentions, from the secrecy that interrupts the continuity of his- 
torical time" (TI, 56, 57-58).53 
52. Wahl, Petite histoire, 83. As Wahl convincingly replied, this interpretation com- 
pletely ignored important features of the enthusiasm: "It is not [necessarily] through Hei- 
degger that one discovers Kierkegaard, even if, sociologically and historically speaking, 
many have done so (some people would not have cared to read Hegel if Marx had not ex- 
isted). It is not from Heidegger that the historians of thought like Delacroix and Basch 
(and a good many Germans) found out about Kierkegaard. Moreover, many discovered 
him not through Heidegger but through Barth, whom Levinas has not mentioned." Ibid., 
87. 
53. Man "is uprooted from history," Levinas concluded, when he "truly approaches 
the other" (TI, 52). With apparent inconsistency, Levinas also remarked, a few pages ear- 
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As for the better known theme of the infinitely different and higher 
other, it is true that Levinas attempted, in his portrait of intersubjec- 
tivity, to "singularize" the ethical relation so that it would escape the 
strictures against generality that had led Kierkegaard himself to reject 
ethics. "Is the relation to the Other that entering into, and disappear- 
ing within, generality?" Levinas asked. "That is what must be asked 
in opposition to Kierkegaard as well as in opposition to Hegel" (PN, 
72). But it is, in a sense, only by importing the singularity of what 
Kierkegaard found in the leap of faith to God back into the ethical stage 
that allowed Levinas to make this innovation. For Levinas, the unique 
alterity of the Kierkegaardian divine is to be found in every human 
other. Even as the French continued their obsession with Kierkegaard, 
as illustrated most dramatically by the Unesco conference of 1964 en- 
titled "Kierkegaard Alive," Levinas had gone beyond Kierkegaard-but 
perhaps only, I have argued in this essay, thanks to partially Kierkgaard- 
ian means.54 
EPILOGUE: BETWEEN MORALITY AND POLITICS 
It thus turns out that the "immodest" Kierkegaard, transformed from 
a violent knight of faith to a peaceful emissary of morality, founded a 
crusade in theology that Levinas continued in ethics. If Kierkegaard's 
separation of the self and his hostility to history left profound legacies 
in Levinas's thought, these legacies were not always persuasive. They 
cast light, I believe, on the depth of Levinas's philosophical affiliation 
with the Kierkegaardian movement. Whether or not he valuably re- 
configured Kierkegaard, Levinas's implausible distinction of individ- 
ual morality from collective politics may have taken his affiliation 
with Kierkegaard too far. 
The stark opposition of morality to politics appears most strikingly 
in Levinas's inaugural Talmudic readings of the early 1960s on the sub- 
ject of Jewish messianism. In a creative interpretation of a debate be- 
tween Shmuel and Jochanan in Tractate Sanhedrin, Levinas-not co- 
incidentally-claimed to find an early version of the conflict between 
Hegelians and Kierkegaardians that obsessed his own contemporaries, 
the "proponents and adversaries of Marxism, that is, the entire think- 
lier in the same book, that the encounter with the other takes place "within the totality 
and history" (TI, 23). 
54. See the proceedings, Jean-Paul Sartre et al., Kierkegaard vivant (cited above). 
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ing world of this mid-twentieth century" (PN, 71).55 In Levinas's view, 
Jochanan and Shmuel were debating whether the hypothetical end of 
history in the advent of the messianic age would lead to a complete res- 
olution of human problems-moral as well as political-or whether, 
because human life is defined by the exigency of ethical commitment, 
moral problems can never disappear (DF, 62-63). 
For the marxisant Jochanan, Levinas explains, the end of days is not 
just a political concept. It would, rather, bring the complete purifica- 
tion and regularization of human life. For Shmuel, in contrast, it is not 
expectable that moral problems will vanish in the messianic age. 
Contrary to Shmuel, who does not ... separate the messianic era from 
the difficulties encountered by morality ... Rabbi Jochanan envisages 
a pure and gracious spiritual life that is in some way stripped of the 
heavy load of things which is made concrete by economics. In his vi- 
sion one can have direct relationships with the Other, who no longer 
appears as poor but as a friend; there are no more professions, only arts; 
and the economic repercussions of actions no longer have any bearing. 
Rabbi Jochanan in some way believes in the ideal of a disincarnated 
spirit, of total grace and harmony, an ideal exempt from any drama; 
while Shmuel, on the other hand, feels the permanent effort of renewal 
demanded by this spiritual life. [DF, 62-63] 
Shmuel's beautiful position, with which Levinas clearly sympathizes, 
does not necessarily turn a blind eye to the difficulties of human inter- 
relationships, even though it denies that these are implicated in any 
way in the end of days. Instead, Shmuel reserves the perfection of hu- 
man relationships on a moral level for "the future world" (it is not al- 
ways familiar to Jews, Levinas remarks, that Judaism distinguishes be- 
tween messianic times and the future world). Crucially, however, the 
future world is outside of history; for this reason, the end of history in 
the messianic days does not bring it about. 
The domain of morality, then, is not and never history. The singu- 
larity of the interpersonal relation is distinguished and exempted from 
the vagaries of historical-and therefore political-life. As Levinas ex- 
plains, for Shmuel the "future" world is paradoxically out of time. It 
"concerns a personal and intimate order, lying outside the achieve- 
ments of history... The future world cannot be announced by a 
55. I have discussed what follows from a different angle and in more detail in "Em- 
manuel Levinas's Talmudic Readings: Between Tradition and Invention," Prooftexts, 
forthcoming. 
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prophet addressing everyone ... The personal salvation of men... es- 
capes the indiscretion of the prophets; no one can fix in advance the 
itinerary of this adventure" (DF, 60-61). The exigencies of morality 
that everyone faces, in other words, are eternal rather than historical. 
The moral adventure-the real quest each person must discharge-is 
reserved for interpersonal intimacy rather than mass conflict. If obli- 
gations are to hold, it is not going to be up to politics and history and 
collectives; it is going to be up to each person alone. The personal is, 
precisely, not political. 
In such passages, Levinas is evidently following Rosenzweig: im- 
provising, like his predecessor, on the exilic topos of Israel the witness 
to the nations, the haven of perpetuity subsisting peacefully in the 
midst of the internecine belligerence of the powers, eternal witnesses 
to their merely historical conflicts. But whereas Rosenzweig is a par- 
ticularist, Levinas is a universalist. Insofar as Levinas wanted to extend 
the monitory and testimonial role that Rosenzweig reserved to Jews to 
the individual subject of any faith or none, one can find Kierkegaard 
too-the suprasectarian and post-Christian Kierkegaard with whom 
several important philosophers of Jewish origin identified (or whom 
they partly invented) in the interwar period. It is not beside the point 
that Jews played such a surprising and prominent role in the French 
Kierkegaard enthusiasm of the age. "Hitler," the Kierkegaardian Albert 
Camus later went so far as to exclaim, "was history in its purest 
form."56 The Kierkegaard enthusiasm helped Levinas to the point of 
arguing, beyond and against Rosenzweig, that there is a Jew in each per- 
son and he is morality. 
The all-consuming cataclysm of the war, and the turbulence that 
has ensued, have in many quarters made Levinas's non- or suprahis- 
torical ethics attractive. It may even have an unexpected but real com- 
patibility with the widespread contemporary fatigue with ideology, 
which is a reminder that the same periods that allow concerned moral- 
ists to come to the fore are often just as propitious for self-congratula- 
tory moralizers. In this regard, it is interesting to note that even in the 
immediate postwar and post-Holocaust age, many-including many 
Jews-insisted on the stubborn tendency of history to resume and re- 
jected the standpoint of pure morality as altogether too comfortable to 
believe or to accept. The restoration of Levinas's Talmudic readings 
56. Albert Camus, The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt, tr. Anthony Bower (New 
York: Vintage, 1954), 150. 
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from his book Difficult Freedom to the colloquies in which they began 
shows that the battle of Hegel and Kierkegaard continued to rage and 
that not everyone took Levinas's side. Politics, some insisted, is not the 
opposite of morality but rather the true forum of moral opportunity. 
Wladimir Rabi complained, in response to Levinas's presentation, that 
"it is simply an alibi to search for eternity, for it amounts to the refusal 
of choice before the problems that interest the modern world." And 
even if Levinas's interest in restricting the scope of politics turns out 
to have been shared by many of his coreligionists, the lengths to which 
he took his Kierkegaardian perspective did not win universal assent. It 
seemed to his audience that the very importance of morality justified 
a different and more compatible understanding of politics than Levinas 
articulated. Emile Touati, for example, asked whether it is, in the end, 
possible to distinguish the two realms; Robert Aron wondered whether 
the exclusion of the Jews from history ignored the role messianism ac- 
cords to human beings to participate in God's design through politics 
and hasten the end of days; the veteran Wahl, always present, objected 
similarly, and in spite of his Kierkegaardian credentials, to the "pre- 
tense" involved in the wish to live outside of history.57 
These criticisms point to potentially severe defects in the approach 
that makes the availability of the other in ethics depend on the immu- 
nity of the moral from the historical and the ethical from the political. 
In the Marxist atmosphere of Parisian intellectual life in the crucial 
decade of the 1950s, when Levinas's thought climaxed, the Kierkegaar- 
dian opposition to history and politics may have functioned as a useful 
antidote to an immoral fashion. But that the Hegelian obsession may 
not have justified the Kierkegaardian vogue even then is suggested by 
the book-length indictment of the movement in the debut of the Amer- 
ican liberal Judith Shklar. "In his beautiful defense of the eternally hu- 
man values of indignation against revolutions justified by historical 
reason," Shklar commented in After Utopia, her panoramic recon- 
struction of the thought of a host of significant figures in the period, 
"Kierkegaard's disgust at Hegel's bland systematization of evil [re- 
turns]." As she insightfully argued, this disgust often seemed purely 
57. Levy-Valensi andHalperin, eds., La conscience juive, 138, 287-88, 144. Levinas's 
promising response: "An 'existence outside of history'... does not mean, as M. W. Rabi 
supposes, the comfort of neutrality, of passive expectation, of non-engagement, the ivory 
tower, the perspective of Sirius.... To live an eternal life is to have the power of judging 
history without waiting for it to end" (Ibid., 147). Cf. Levy-Valensi and Halperin, eds., La 
conscience juive face a 1'histoire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), 3-148. 
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reactive, leading into the blind alley of "alienation," a result as poten- 
tially nefarious as the engagement it simply reversed. "Totalitarian- 
ism," she commented, "has only intensified the romantic's sense of 
apartness from history.... [Iln this extreme alienation lies also an ad- 
mission of futility, for history is now too far from [him] to be even un- 
derstood."58 
Is this remark applicable to Levinas's Betrachtungen eines Unpoli- 
tischen, rooted as they are in the same Kierkegaardian movements, pro- 
duced during the same period, and in response to the same threats?59 
In response to the danger that it is, I will conclude by noting the obvi- 
ous. The polarization between morality and politics creates the mis- 
taken impression that while morality is safe and certain, beautiful and 
perfect, politics is shadowy and fallen, even soiled and dirty. Yet even 
eternal moral principles, should they turn out to exist, would require 
a politics; indeed, one could say that the belief in their immediate rel- 
evance to the political world is itself a moral necessity. One may un- 
derstandably want to ask, in response to the much-discussed "ethical 
turn" among Western intellectuals, whether a moral doctrine that 
claims to be outside and above politics is plausible on moral grounds.60 
But more fundamentally and troublingly, I think, it is implausible 
to distinguish entirely or shield completely the domain of interper- 
sonal and face-to-face transactions where Levinas saw morality oper- 
58. Judith N. Shklar, After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith (Princeton: Prince- 
ton University Press, 1957), 130. 
59. Cf. Fritz R. Stern, "The Political Consequences of the Unpolitical German," in 
The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany (New 
York: Knopf, 1971). It is interesting that Levinas attempted to preserve the grounds for 
Rosenzweig's opposition to Zionism in his own Zionist vision. One possible criticism of 
this version of Zionism is obvious: by adopting the fiction that Jews are not political, it 
is blind to their inevitably political actions. 
60. There are many forms of the excessively acute contrast between morality and pol- 
itics. As Michael Ignatieff has noted, "[h]uman rights activism likes to portray itself as 
an anti-politics, in defense of universal moral claims meant to delegitimize 'political' 
(i.e., ideological or sectarian) justifications for the abuse of human beings," but this self- 
understanding is an "illusion." Ignatieff et al., Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 
ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 9, 29. Meanwhile 
Jacques Derrida's preservation of the strict opposition between morality and politics (or 
justice and law) in his attempt to outline a politics of the Levinasian other seems to lead 
only (in Dominick LaCapra's apt description) "in the direction of an unguardedly hyper- 
bolic stress on the enigmatic call of an open or empty utopia" and to "the hope-against 
hope of ... a messianic, ecstatic, even wonder-struck expectancy whose fulfillment is 
impossible or endlessly deferred." LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 197, 218. Both comments suggest the need for a 
more immediate connection or blurred distinction between morality and politics. 
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ating from mass politics and collective history. If a transhistorical the- 
ory of intersubjectivity, such as the one Levinas offered, is important 
to develop, it has to be a theory open to (if not compatible with) the les- 
son of modern social theory that the profoundest intimacies of human 
interactions are affected by their historical moment and tinged and of- 
ten tainted by the power relationships of collective politics. In coming 
to a skeptical point of view on the premise that morality and politics 
are absolutely and generically different, one may well want to avoid the 
equal and opposite extreme, Friedrich Engels's irresponsible emphatic 
rejection of "any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate, and 
forever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world... 
has its permanent principles which stand above history."61 All the 
same, la morale pour la morale seems little better than la politique 
pour la politique. A beautiful soul is no real substitute for dirty hands. 
It is perhaps a great irony, but it is nonetheless true, that Kierkegaard 
has, through Levinas's appropriation, inadvertently but in the end in- 
contestably helped teach European philosophy how to be moral. Yet 
just as each person must learn to live, somehow, both in biographical 
and historical time, each must learn, somehow, to be more than moral. 
The viewpoint of morality, though it is essential, is by itself not 
enough. The line between morality and politics, because it is relative, 
is constantly and necessarily crossed. If so, this activity, even when un- 
dertaken in the name of the morality Levinas movingly defended, will 
have to occur in spite of his immunization of the self from history and 
the truths of ethics from the affairs of the day. There is a burden of re- 
sponsibility, but there is even more to shoulder. 
61. As cited from theAnti-Diihring in Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985), 11. Lukes argues that Hegel's and Marx's (and Jochanan's?) sub- 
ordination of morality to politics, though from one point of view an attack on morality, 
is from another perspective simply a different moral vision. 
